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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






SARA ANN EDMONDSON, 




 LILLISTON FORD INC; 
 JANES AND JOHN DOES 1-10, individually and as owners, officers,  
 directors, founders, managers, agents, servants, employees, representatives 
 and/or independent contractors of LILLISTON FORD, INC.; 
 XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-10 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-13-cv-07704) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 22, 2017 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 







                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Sara Ann Edmondson appeals from the District Court’s order denying her motion 
to vacate an arbitration award entered against her in favor of Lilliston Ford, Inc. 
(“Lilliston”), and granting Lilliston’s cross-motion to confirm the arbitration award and 
its application for attorneys’ fees and costs.  For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm 
the District Court’s order. 
In 2013, Edmondson filed a complaint in the District Court raising claims under 
the Federal Odometer Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, as well as state law 
claims for, inter alia, fraud.  The claims stem from alleged wrongs related to her purchase 
of a used car from Lilliston.  In short, pursuant to a Retail Installment Agreement (“the 
Agreement”), Edmondson agreed to trade a 2004 Lincoln LS for an $800 credit towards 
the purchase of a used Ford Focus.  Shortly after the purchase, Edmondson experienced 
problems with the Ford Focus.  Lilliston refused her attempt to return the car and 
demanded title to the Lincoln or reimbursement for the $800 credit she received for the 
purchase.  After protracted proceedings, including a previous appeal to this Court1, the 
District Court granted Edmondson’s motion to compel arbitration under the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).     
The parties could not agree on the selection of an arbitrator, or on which party was 
responsible for the costs associated with arbitration.  Edmondson filed a demand for 
arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (AAA).  The AAA noted that the 
arbitration clause had not been registered through its Consumer Clause Registry; it 
                                                                
1 See Edmondson v. Lilliston Ford, Inc., 593 F. App’x 108 (3d Cir. 2014) (vacating an 
order dismissing a motion to compel arbitration). 
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directed Lilliston to register the arbitration clause, and to pay the associated registry and 
filing fees.  Lilliston refused to mediate before the AAA, stating that it had “severed ties” 
with it “years ago”; consequently, the AAA declined to administer the case.  Edmondson 
then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the arbitration clause was void 
because Lilliston had fraudulently represented its intent to arbitrate with the AAA, as 
evidenced by its failure to register the arbitration clause with the AAA, and its severance 
of ties with the AAA.  After a hearing on the motion, the District Court entered an order 
directing the parties to show cause why the agreement did not “require the parties to 
submit their disputes to arbitration conducted by the AAA or by an individual or 
organization authorized by the AAA and the Defendants to pay the costs associated with 
the arbitration as set forth in the Consumer Arbitration Rules.”  Dist. Court’s March 3, 
2016 Op. at 5.  Lilliston filed a notice of intent to consent to arbitration with the AAA, 
and the arbitration proceedings were held in December 2016.    
The AAA arbitrator issued an award dismissing all of Edmondson’s claims and 
ordering her to execute documents vesting clear title to the Lincoln to Lilliston within 14 
days, or to refund the $800 and remove the Lincoln from Lilliston’s property.  In addition 
to awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, the award also indicated that Lilliston “shall be 
entitled to apply for an Order in a Court of competent jurisdiction granting clear title to 
the 2004 Lincoln.”  Appellee’s Suppl. App. at 133a.    
Edmondson moved to vacate the arbitration award, and Lilliston moved to confirm 
it.  The District Court entered judgment on April 26, 2017, confirming the arbitration 
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award, awarding fees and costs totaling $10,709.39, and denying the motion to vacate.   
This appeal ensued. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 16.2  We review 
the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and any factual findings for clear error.  
See Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 2014); Freeman v. 
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2013).  Our review of the 
underlying arbitration award is “extremely deferential.”  Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 
365, 372 (3d Cir. 2003).  Under the FAA, a court may vacate an arbitration award only if  
"(1) it ‘was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;’ (2) the arbitrator was 
‘partial[] or corrupt[];’ (3) the arbitrator unjustifiably refused to postpone the hearing, 
refused to consider ‘evidence pertinent and material to the controversy,’ or engaged in 
any other ‘misbehavior’ that prejudiced the rights of a party; or (4) the arbitrator 
‘exceeded [his or her] powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.’"  Roadway Package 
Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 291 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10), 
                                                                
2 To the extent the Court’s order was not final when entered, it became final at the time 
that the 30-day period for filing the motion for a clear title expired without any action by 
Lilliston.  See e.g. Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(order becomes final where plaintiff given 30 days to amend complaint, but instead files 
notice of appeal within that time).  In any event, the arbitration award was confirmed in 
its entirety, and was thus immediately appealable.  See Virgin Islands Hous. Auth. v. 
Coastal Gen. Const. Servs. Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 913 (3d Cir. 1994); see also 19 J. Moore, 
et al., Moore’s Manual:  Federal Practice and Procedure, § 203.12[4][a] (2016) (“An 
order confirming an arbitration award or denying the confirmation of an award in its 
entirety is immediately appealable as of right as a final decision.”).    
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abrogated on other grounds by Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 
(2008).   
On appeal, as she did below, Edmondson appears to argue that the arbitration 
award should be vacated on the first two of these bases.  She has wholly failed to 
establish her contention that Lilliston and the arbitrator are part of a “criminal enterprise” 
or that they “were complicit in the intentional misrepresentations and concealments of 
material facts on the lease and sales contracts.”  Appellant’s Br. at “6.”3  There is simply 
no evidence of fraud or corruption in the record as it pertains to the arbitration award. 
The mainstay of Edmondson’s appeal is her argument that the arbitration clause 
was invalid, and, therefore, that the contract was void ab initio.  The Agreement’s 
arbitration provision provides that it “shall be conducted in accordance” with the 
Consumer Arbitration Rules (“the Rules”) of the AAA, which, in turn, require the 
arbitration to be administered by the AAA.  See Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Consumer 
Arbitration Rules R-1 (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.adr.org/consumer.  Edmondson argues 
that the arbitration clause is void because of Lilliston’s failure to register it with the 
AAA, and because Lilliston stated that it had “severed its ties” with the AAA.   In 
rejecting this argument, the District Court concluded that the fact that Lilliston did not 
have a relationship with the AAA at the time of the Agreement “is neither here nor 
there.”  Dist. Court’s April 26, 2017 Op. at 8 n.6.  We agree.  The AAA administers 
arbitrations where there is no AAA arbitration clause between the parties.  See R-3 of the 
                                                                
3 Appellant created her own pagination for her brief; these references are on the page 
numbered “6,” which is actually page 10. 
6 
 
Rules.  Moreover, it was not until September 1, 2014, after the Agreement was executed 
and, indeed, after the complaint was filed, that the AAA required businesses to register an 
arbitration clause through the AAA’s Consumer Clause Registry.  See R-12.  In any 
event, the Rules make clear that failure to register prior to the filing of a demand for 
arbitration is of no moment; rather, the AAA will administer the arbitration once the 
business pays the review and registry fees.  Id.  That is what occurred here: Lilliston paid 
the requisite fees and the AAA agreed to administer the arbitration, just as Edmondson 
had repeatedly urged was required by the Agreement.4  Accordingly, because there was 
no basis for invalidating the arbitration clause, and there were no other disputes regarding 
its scope, the District Court properly “direct[ed] the parties to proceed to arbitration in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement.”  9 U.S.C. § 4.   
Finally, the arbitrator determined that Lilliston was entitled to “reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs” incurred in connection with the enforcement of the arbitration 
award.5  Lilliston submitted to the District Court a Certification of fees and costs, which 
                                                                
4 Edmondson makes much of the fact that, in a letter declining to administer the case after 
the initial demand for arbitration, the AAA asked Lilliston to remove reference to the 
AAA from the consumer arbitration clause that appeared in Lilliston’s lease and sales 
agreements, and advised that it may decline to administer future consumer arbitrations 
involving Lilliston.  This was merely in response to Lilliston’s failure to pay the filing 
and registry fees.  Once the fees were paid, the AAA agreed to administer the matter, as 
permitted by the Rules.  
5 “[A]rbitrators derive their powers from the parties’ agreement.”  White Springs Agric. 
Chems., Inc. v. Glawson Investments Corp., 660 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2011).  The 
Agreement provided that the parties shall bear their own fees and costs, “except when 
awarded by the arbitrator under applicable law.”  Appellee’s Suppl. App. at 61a.  
Accordingly, the District Court had no basis to disturb the arbitration award to the extent 
it granted fees and costs.  White Springs, 660 F.3d at 1281 (explaining that courts do not 
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included a detailed breakdown of the hours billed in connection with its efforts to enforce 
the arbitration award.  Edmondson failed to raise any specific objections to the 
Certification.  United States v. Eleven Vehicles, Their Equip. & Accessories, 200 F.3d 
203, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a district court may not award less in fees than 
requested unless the opposing party makes specific objections to the fee request).  The 
District Court nevertheless reviewed the Certification, and explained its basis for 
concluding that the bill was both reasonable and adequately supported.  We find no abuse 
of discretion in its determination.  See In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 
727 (3d Cir. 2001). 
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s order.6 
                                                                
review the legal merits of the arbitrator’s award where there is a basis for it in the 
agreement). 
6 Edmondson’s motion for a stay is denied.   
